The effect of government subsidies on private R&D: evidence from geographic variation in support program funding by Einiö, Elias
öMmföäflsäafaäsflassflassflas 
ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff  
 
Discussion Papers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The effect of government subsidies on private 
R&D: evidence from geographic variation in 
support program funding 
 
 
Elias Einiö 
University of Helsinki and HECER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion Paper No. 263 
May 2009 
 
ISSN 1795-0562 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HECER – Helsinki Center of Economic Research, P.O. Box 17 (Arkadiankatu 7), FI-00014 
University of Helsinki, FINLAND, Tel +358-9-191-28780, Fax +358-9-191-28781,  
E-mail info-hecer@helsinki.fi, Internet www.hecer.fi 
HECER 
Discussion Paper No. 263 
 
The effect of government subsidies on private 
R&D: evidence from geographic variation in 
support program funding* 
 
Abstract 
 
Despite the prevalence of government research and development (R&D) support 
programs, evaluation studies based on explicit differences in support allocation are rare. In 
this article the identification of the causal effect of government support on private R&D 
effort is based on regional differences in eligibility for European Union Regional 
Development Funds (ERDF) determined by the population-density rule. Our data is 
constructed by linking a broad R&D survey to administrative data on all R&D support 
applications in Finland over the years 2000-2006. We find evidence that the support 
program has induced additional private R&D among the participants who entered it as a 
result of higher funding in their region. Among this group one subsidy euro induced 
additional R&D worth at least 1.5 euro.  
 
JEL Classification: H25, H32, O38 
 
Keywords: Policy evaluation, R&D, subsidies, technology policy, treatment effects 
 
 
Elias Einiö 
 
Department of Economics  
University of Helsinki  
P.O.Box 17 (Arkadiankatu 7) 
FI-00014 University of Helsinki 
FINLAND 
 
e-mail: elias.einio@helsinki.fi 
 
 
* Thanks are due to Richard Blundell, Chiara Criscuolo, Erkki Koskela, Tuomas 
Pekkarinen, Otto Toivanen, Matti Sarvimäki, Jouko Verho and numerous seminar 
participants for helpful comments and suggestions. The data used in this article are 
confidential but the author's access is not exclusive. Financial support from the Finnish 
Cultural Foundation, the Jenny and Antti Wihuri Foundation, the OP-Pohjola Group 
Research Foundation, and the Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. 
1 Introduction
Economic growth depends essentially on the application of new knowledge in order to
develop improved products and production processes. Several authors have emphasized
the role of research and development (R&D) as the engine of growth (Romer, 1990;
Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992). A substantial amount of new
knowledge is produced in innovation projects conducted by firms in the private sector.
However, due to positive externalities arising from incomplete appropriability of the results
and uncertainty about their success, firms may engage in less R&D than is socially optimal
(Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1962). In order to foster innovative activities and economic growth
governments in numerous countries have introduced R&D support programs aimed at
increasing R&D effort in the private sector.1 Although support programs are common
across industrialized economies, there is lack of evidence of their impacts on private R&D
effort based on explicit differences in support policies. The main contribution of this article
is to provide such evidence by exploiting geographic variation in public R&D support
funding arising from the European Union population density rules governing state aid to
private businesses.
Direct government subsidies can induce firms to perform R&D that without the sup-
port would be privately unprofitable.2 The efficiency of the support program depends
crucially on the qualities of the projects that are taken into it. A major concern is that
program managers may be encouraged to support projects with the best technical merits
and the highest potential for commercial success. As these projects typically have high
private returns they will be undertaken even in the absence of the support. In this case
government support may induce only a little additional R&D if any at all.
The main econometric challenge in evaluating R&D support programs arises from the
fact that subsidies are typically not randomly assigned, and as a result groups of supported
and unsupported firms are not directly comparable. Moreover, some of the characteristics
affecting the selection, such as research productivity, are very seldom observed by the
researcher. In this case OLS and other methods based on the assumption that, condi-
1Public R&D grants covered about 7.5 percent of private R&D in the OECD countries in 2004 (OECD,
2006). For an overview of R&D tax credits which are another commonly used fiscal incentive for R&D
investment, see Bloom, Griffith, and Van Reenen (2002).
2For an extensive discussion on the micro- and macro-economic effects of public R&D support, see
David, Hall, and Toole (2000). For an R&D-driven growth model incorporating R&D subsidies, see
Davidson and Segerstrom (1998).
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tional on observed factors, the support is randomly assigned are likely to yield biased
estimates of the causal effect of the program because it seems unlikely that conditioning
on the observable attributes is sufficient to avoid differences in the expected performance
between the supported and unsupported groups in the absence of the treatment (Jaffe,
2002).3 In order to assess the selection on unobservable attributes Wallsten (2000) uses
an instrumental variables (IV) approach based on the idea that differences in government
R&D-support funding across industries induce variation in the likelihood of receiving the
support and finds that the grants allocated by the SBIR program in the US crowded
out private R&D expenditures dollar for dollar.4 However, there is a concern that the
government may allocate its support partly in line with technological opportunities. Such
opportunities may differ across industries and also affect R&D investment decisions, and
variation in R&D support funding across industries is likely to be endogenous as a result
(David, Hall, and Toole, 2000).
In this article, the identification of the effect of program participation is based on geo-
graphic variation in potentially available R&D-support funding arising from the allocation
of European Union Regional Development Funds (ERDF) in Finland.5 These differences
in allocation induce variation in the probability of program participation, which facili-
tates the identification of the causal effect of program participation on R&D effort. The
advantage of our approach is that it is based on explicit differences in public policies
with well-defined publicly stated allocation criteria. The regional provision of ERDF in
Finland is especially suitable for program evaluation purposes because there are regions
receiving the highest levels of European Union regional development aid because of low
population density (rather than because of low levels of R&D investment or poor eco-
nomic performance, for example). Furthermore, we address the potential endogeneity of
this eligibility rule by controlling for the effect of population density on the outcome of
interest, firm-level R&D expenditure.
We believe that results concerning the Finnish program may in a significant way im-
3For studies in which identification is based on the assumption of random assignment after conditioning
on observable characteristics, see Howe and McFetridge (1976), Irwin and Klenow (1996), Lerner (1999),
and Almus and Czarnitzki (2003). Lach (2002), and Görg and Strobl (2007) also control for time-invariant
unobserved firm characteristics affecting R&D effort.
4For studies using a structural approach see González, Jamandreu, and Pazó (2005) and Takalo,
Tanayama, and Toivanen (2008).
5Criscuolo, Martin, Overman, and Van Reenen (2007) also use regional variation in the European
Commission rules on regional-support eligibility in a study evaluating an investment subsidy program in
the UK.
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prove our understanding about the potential of R&D subsidies to enhance private inno-
vative efforts in technologically advanced economies because Finland has a large export-
oriented high-tech sector and there are no other R&D policy instruments, such as tax
exemptions, to complicate the evaluation analysis. Using data constructed by linking a
broad R&D survey to administrative information on all recipients of government R&D
subsidies over the years 2000-2006 we find evidence of the positive effect of the program on
R&D expenditure among firms that entered it as a result of higher ERDF funding in their
region. A conservative estimate is that one subsidy euro induces 1.5 euro of additional
company R&D. Our findings indicate that government assistance may induce additional
R&D, and that the impact may be substantial.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional
setting of the R&D support policy in Finland and Section 3 presents the data. The
empirical strategy for identifying the causal effect of the participation in the R&D support
program on private R&D effort is explained in Section 4, Section 5 presents the results
and several robustness tests verifying the identification strategy and Section 6 concludes
the article.
2 The Institutional Setting
The implementation of the Finnish technology policy is centralized in the Funding Agency
for Technology and Innovation (Tekes), which is the only authority responsible for allo-
cating government subsidies to R&D projects conducted by private businesses. During
the period 2000-2005 the agency granted direct R&D subsidies worth 970 million euro.
The Tekes budget comes mainly from the Finnish Government. Some areas receive funds
from the ERDF in addition to national funding.
The Finnish R&D support program
The publicly expressed objective of the Finnish R&D support program is to encourage
firms to start up new and accelerate the completion of ongoing R&D projects. All firms
operating in Finland may apply for funding. The main criteria for being selected into the
program include commercial potential (in terms of expected future sales), technological
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challenge, available resources (e.g., R&D staff qualified to conduct the project), and the
importance of the agency’s support to the success of the project. The agency’s Internet
pages emphasize that projects involving technological and commercial risks and which
would not be fully implemented without agency funding are specifically supported.6
Firms receive funding in the form of direct subsidies and low-interest loans. Direct
subsidies are granted to research projects that provide the basis for future product and
process development, the results of which are not immediately commercializable. High
technological challenge, which reflects the riskiness of the project, increases the proba-
bility of receiving a direct subsidy. In the case of precompetitive projects involving the
development of new products or processes that have direct commercial value, loans are
the main form of funding. Funding consisting partly of direct subsidies and partly of loans
is also available. Direct subsidies cover 25-50 percent of the realized costs of the project
up to an amount that the agency has approved as the maximum cost. In order to receive
a subsidy payment firms must present an account of the realized costs.
The program has several characteristics that could be expected to induce efficiency.
The most important is the criterion that agency funding is necessary for the completion
of the project. The program also has to satisfy European Union regulations for state
support of R&D, adherence to which is monitored by the European Commission. The
European Commission states in its community framework covering R&D aid that it will
make special efforts to verify that the planned support will induce firms to pursue research
they would not otherwise have pursued.7
There are still several reasons why the program may be inefficient, however. The
agency may be unable to identify the projects for which its funding is of the essence. On
the other hand, it is not obvious whether or not the program is actually abiding by its
stated selection rules and European Union regulations. In its own effectiveness analysis
it relies on figures on the average success of the projects and does not mention the se-
lection problem which may confound the causal interpretations. There is a need for a
careful econometric evaluation addressing the selection problem in order to demonstrate
the efficiency of the program. Such an analysis requires a credible source of exogenous
variation in the program-participation status. In order to identify the effects of govern-
6Http://www.tekes.fi (Accessed April 18, 2007).
7Official Journal of the European Union C 45, 17.2.1996.
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ment assistance on private R&D we use regional variation in the available government
R&D funding.
Regional differences in government R&D funding
The Finnish regional policy is based on districts delineated in accordance with European
Union criteria. Finland joined the European Union in 1995, bargaining in the accession
negotiations for a large share of the country to be eligible for the highest level of regional
development aid over the program period 1995-1999. The criterion for eligibility was “no
more than 8 persons per km2”.8 The region receiving the highest level of aid (Objective 1)
was largely maintained for the program period 2000-2006.9 Morover, a substantial part of
the country was considered eligible for the second highest level of aid (Objective 2) and
transitional support (Objective 4). Figure 1 depicts these regional provisions.
The regional variation in available government R&D funding arises because Tekes is
entitled to withdraw larger amounts from the ERDF in areas eligible for higher levels of
aid. The total government R&D funding to the private sector relative to GDP in 2000-
2006 was 17 percent higher in regions under Objective 1 than in those under Objective 2.10
This suggests that ERDF funding may produce substantial variation in the probability of
being accepted into the program. This is verified in the empirical analysis, which indicates
that the probability of receiving the subsidy is substantially higher in the regions under
Objective 1 compared to those eligible for a lower level of aid.
3 Data
We constructed our data by linking several administrative datasets to a broad R&D
survey, all maintained by Statistics Finland.
8See Protocol 6 of the EU Act of Accession of 1994.
9See Article 3 in the European Council regulation No 1260/1999 on laying down the general provisions
on the Structural Funds (The Official Journal of the European Union L 161, 26.6.1999). Part of Central
Finland became eligible for highest level of aid due to changes in the regional units within which the
population densities were calculated. The only change to the previous provision was that the whole
region of Pohjois-Savo was included in Objective 1, as part of this region was under Objectives 2 and 5b
in the previous period.
10The calculation is based on data on the regional R&D funding provided by Tekes and regional GDP
figures from Statistics Finland. It includes the districts of Etelä-Savo, Pohjois-Savo and Pohjois-Karjala
from the Objective 1 area, and Häme and Etelä-Karjala from the Objective 2 area, which are complete
regional-level statistical units within the objective areas.
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We drew administrative data on R&D-support allocation from the Firm Assistance
Database (FAD), which provides information on all applications submitted to Tekes during
the period 2000-2006. Because Tekes is the only authority allocating R&D subsidies, the
FAD information covers all government R&D subsidy recipients. Furthermore, because
we had information on all subsidy recipients, we were able to identify whether any firm
in any other database had received a subsidy or not. This was particularly important in
the construction of the control group with which we compared the performance of the
subsidized firms. The FAD contains the following project-level information: the project
identifier number, the firm identifier number, the amount applied for, the decisions on
the amount of subsidy or loans granted, if any, the date of the decision, and the date
and amount of each payment. For each project, we allocated the received amount of
subsidy uniformly over each payment period. We then constructed the firm-level data by
aggregating the project-level data according to the firm identifier number.
We obtained information on R&D expenditure from the annual R&D survey panel
(RDS). The initial version was based on a census conducted in 1995. Since then, the
main survey frame has covered all firms reporting positive R&D expenditure in the sur-
veyed year, or expecting to conduct R&D in the following year. It also includes all firms
employing at least 100 persons. The main survey frame is augmented by drawing a ran-
dom sample from the population of firms not included in it. Finally, the survey includes
all firms that had applied for Tekes funding.11 The response rate for the survey was
around 85-87 percent during the period under observation.
We drew information on sales and fixed assets from the Financial Statement Database
(FSD). If no information was available we used sales figures from the Business Register
Firm-Level Database (BRFD), which is based on data provided by the tax authorities.
We also obtained administrative information on the age and export status of the firms
from the BRDF.
Our identification is based on the regional variation in the government R&D funding
and thus it is essential to accurately identify the location of each firm. Our primary
source was the RDS, which provides firm-level information on the regional distribution of
11Thus the RDS is not a random sample of R&D-inactive and new firms. A potential concern is that
the proportion of supported firms in the higher-aid region is overestimated in our sample because of the
non-random sampling of applicant firms. The robustness tests presented in Section 5 indicate that such
concern is not relevant for our results.
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R&D activities on the municipal level: a firm was defined as being located in a region12
if it conducts all of its R&D there. A secondary source of location information is the
Business Register Plant-Level Database (BRPD)13, which yields the following plant-level
information: the plant identification number, the identification number of the parent firm,
the postcode for the location, and the number of employees. We used this information in
order to calculate firm-level employment by region. The secondary location criterion was
that all of the firm’s employees are based in the relevant region.
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the analysis sample and the R&D survey
panel sample. In the table, year t−1 refers to the year before and year t+1 to the year after
supported firms entered the program.14 The table shows that the group of supported firms,
while slightly younger on average, had higher average sales and fixed assets relative to
the unsupported group. In the year before being granted the subsidy they were devoting,
on average, 691,451 euro to R&D while the average R&D expenditure in the control
group was 335,694 euro. The distribution of R&D expenditure is very skewed and the
pre-treatment differences between the treatment and control groups are less pronounced
when the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles are compared. In the year following a positive
grant decision the grantees had increased their average R&D expenditure to 850,024 euro
and were receiving an average annual subsidy flow of 70,762 euro. The subsidies covered,
on average, 26 percent of the total R&D costs. The average change in R&D expenditure
among the supported firms from the year before they accessed the program to the year
following it was 158,573 euro, whereas among the unsupported group the corresponding
change was 36,794 euro. A simple before-after estimate suggests that the average effect of
the program was 158,573 - 36,794 = 121,779 euro. However, this naive estimate is likely
to suffer from selection bias because the support was not assigned randomly, and it is
unlikely that the treatment and control groups are directly comparable.
12An ERDF area or other relevant regional unit used in the analysis.
13If a firm has only one plant it is always included in this database. For multi-plant firms the information
is based on a questionnaire.
14For a detailed definition of treatment and control groups see Section 4.
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4 The empirical strategy
This section explains the empirical strategy adopted for identifying the causal effect of the
R&D support program. The aim is to assess whether, as a result of becoming a program
participant, the firm increased its R&D expenditure. The “treatment group” comprise the
firms that started in the support program in year t. We estimate the effect of program
participation on R&D effort in the second participation year t+ 1 for two reasons. First,
because decisions are given at any point of the year, and it may take some time before the
firm gets the subsidized project running after a grant decision, much of the participation
effect on annual R&D expenditure is likely to emerge in future years. Second, only a very
small proportion of subsidized projects last less than one year.15 In order to ensure that
the firm was supported in year t + 1, those in the treatment group had to have received
payments from the agency in that year. The “control group” comprised firms that did not
receive any payments from the agency in the consecutive three years t−1, t, and t+1. In
order to eliminate the possible long-term effects of the program among the control group,
it was also required that the firms in it did not fulfill the criteria for the treatment group
in other years.
The basis of the empirical analysis is the following R&D equation:
log(R&Di,t+1) = φj(i),t + γDit + βXit + it, (1)
where i, j and t indicate the firm, industry and time, respectively. The treatment dummy
variable Dit is one (zero) if firm i was in the treatment (control) group in year t. Because
the time patterns of R&D investment may differ across industries, and support allocation
across industries may be partly determined by differences in R&D intensity, we allow
for industry- and time-specific differences, φj(i),t, in R&D expenditure. The vector Xit
includes a set of pre-treatment firm characteristics. Although we have panel data, we
are unable to include firm fixed effects because there is no within-firm variation in our
instrument, the ERDF-region indicator. However, we include a second-order polynomial
of logged R&D in year t − 1 to control for permanent differences in the levels of R&D
expenditure. We also include the log of sales and fixed assets in year t − 1 in order to
15Among the projects ending in the period 2001-2003 only 2.9 percent lasted less than one year, while
64.8 percent lasted between one and three years (Tekes, 2008).
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control for firm size and capital intensity, a second-order polynomial of age to control for
age effects and whether the firm is a start-up, and a dummy variable indicating whether
or not the firm is exporting.
Our parameter of interest is γ, the causal effect of program participation on the log
of R&D expenditure. When γ ≤ 0 the program does not induce additional R&D and
the firms would have made at least the same R&D investments in the absence of the
subsidy. If γ > 0 the support scheme induces additional R&D. As γ is the coefficient
for a binary program-participation dummy and not for the amount of subsidy, it is not
directly informative about how many additional euros of additional R&D one subsidy
euro induces. In the case where a fixed proportion of R&D that would not have been
realized without the subsidy is supported, one subsidy euro will generate additional R&D
worth the inverse of the compensation rate (the share of realized R&D costs covered by
the subsidy). However, this simple rule is no longer valid if the firm is able to cover
R&D costs that would have been realized without the subsidy. However, we can deduce
that when the subsidy is the largest possible, i.e. 50 percent of the firm’s total post-
treatment R&D expenditure, a necessary condition for no crowding-out is that γ is at
least log(2) ≈ 0.694.16 If γ ∈ (0, log(2)), we cannot rule out the possibility that some of
the support is crowding-out the firm’s own R&D investment.
The R&D support program selects the participants partly according to technological
potential and expectations of commercial success, which is not observed. Because the
firm’s investment decisions also depend on these factors, the program-participation status
Dit and the error term it in the R&D equation may be correlated, which would result
in biases in the least squares estimates of the causal effect of the program γ. In order to
overcome this selection problem, we followed the approach taken by Lichtenberg (1988)
and Wallsten (2000) in that we exploited the variation in the potentially awardable R&D
funding.17 Instead of relying on variation across the lines of business or industry, we uti-
lized regional variation in public R&D support funding across the ERDF areas. We argue
16For example, suppose that R&D expenditure by the firm is z0 when unsupported and cz0 when
supported. Consider the case in which the firm received the largest possible amount of support, i.e. the
whole post-treatment R&D cost cz0 is eligible for the maximum compensation rate of 0.5. In this case
one subsidy euro will generate (cz0 − z0)/0.5cz0 euros of additional private R&D. The no-crowding-out
condition requires that one subsidy euro induces additional R&D worth at least one euro. This implies
c ≥ 2 for no crowding-out under maximum compensation.
17Lichtenberg’s potentially awardable R&D contracts are calculated as the total value of government
contracts for two-digit Federal Supply Code the firm sold to. Wallsten applies a similar approach to
awardable R&D funds.
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that this approach has two advantages. First, the government agency may allocate its
support partly in line with technological opportunities, which may differ across industries
and also affect R&D investment decisions (David, Hall, and Toole, 2000). As a result,
industry level variation in R&D support funding is likely to be endogenous. Second, in our
empirical setup variation in R&D support funding is based on explicit differences in pub-
lic policies imposed on comparable firms with well-defined and publicly stated allocation
criteria.
We argue that differences in R&D support funding across the ERDF 1 border produce
exogenous variation in program participation for two reasons. First, ERDF 1 eligibility is
based on the criterion that the population density in the region is “no more than 8 persons
per square kilometer” rather than on direct performance measures of the local economy.
Second, we are able to control for the effect of population density on R&D expenditure
by estimating the following equation:
log(R&Di,t+1) = φj(i),t + γiDit + βXit + log(POPDENr(i),t−1) + it, (2)
where we have included the log of the population density in year t− 1 in NUTS 4 region
r.18 This empirical setup resembles the regression discontinuity framework in that we
are able to control for the effect of the factor underlying the eligibility for the treatment
on the outcome of interest.19 Several robustness tests presented in Section 5 verify the
exogeneity of the regional support allocation.
In equation (2) we also make explicit the fact that the effect of program participation
may differ across participants, i.e. γi 6= γj for i 6= j. Imbens and Angrist (1994) show
that when the effects of the treatment are heterogeneous the IV estimate of the treatment
parameter is the local average treatment effect (LATE), i.e. the average effect of the
treatment among the participants whose treatment status the instrument changes.20 In
the context of this study, LATE is the effect of program participation among the firms
entering the program as a result of higher level of funding in the ERDF 1 region.
18For the full NUTS 4 classification see http://www.stat.fi/meta/luokitukset/seutukunta/001-2007/.
19Our empirical setup differs from what would be considered a policy discontinuity design in two
respects. First, the variation in population density we utilize is across a finer regional classification than
the one on which the original provisions are based. Second, we control for the current level of population
density rather than the pre-program population density on which the original provisions are based.
20Abadie (2003) generalizes this result for the case in which covariates may be included in the model
and shows that in this case LATE is identified provided that the probability of participation is linear in
the instruments.
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The relaxation of the assumption that the effect of the program is the same for all
participants is especially relevant in the evaluation of R&D support programs because it is
likely that the agency selects projects partly according to potential research productivity
and expected success. For example, if it selects projects with better research productivity,
i.e. those that are likely to be privately profitable and on which the program is expected
to have only a minor impact, the average effect of the program among the treated firms
is expected to be small. On the other hand, if the agency selects projects with lower
potential research productivity that are likely to be privately unprofitable, the average
effect of the program among the treated firms is expected to be larger.
5 Results
Table 2 presents the estimation results for the R&D equation (2). The first column
reports the OLS estimates whereas the second and third report the first- and second-
stage estimates from the two-stage least squares procedure. The OLS estimate of 0.342
suggests that the support program had a positive effect on R&D expenditure. However, if
selection into the program is affected by unobservable firm characteristics that also affect
the R&D investment decision, the OLS estimate is likely to be biased.
In order to address the selection problem, we use an ERDF region dummy variable as
an instrument for participation status. We use a binary area classification in which the
first class includes the region receiving the most aid (ERDF 1) and the second class all
those receiving less aid (ERDF 0, 2 and 4) . In Table 2, the first-stage estimate for the
ERDF dummy variable shows that the probability of program participation is 0.138 points
higher in the Objective 1 region, indicating that regional differences in available R&D
support funding induce substantial differences in the probability of receiving support.
The IV estimate of the causal effect of program participation is 1.391, and significant at
the 95 percent confidence level. This suggests that as a result of the program the R&D
expenditure among the supported firms was four times larger than it would have been
in the absence of the support. As the estimate is clearly larger than log(2), this result
also satisfies the necessary condition for no crowding-out derived in the previous section.
Furthermore, in the extreme case of maximum subsidy compensation of 50 percent of the
total post-treatment R&D costs, this result suggests that one subsidy euro induced at
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least 1.5 euro of additional company R&D.21
Table 3 shows the time patterns of the effect of the support program in the periods
2000-2002 and 2003-2005. The first-stage coefficients of the ERDF instrument show a
decreasing trend over time, which is largely attributable to the relatively larger amount
of ERDF funding that is allocated at the beginning of the program period. As a result,
the differences in the probability of receiving support induced by regional variation in
public funding are more pronounced in the first years of the program. These results
indicate that it is indeed the additional funding provided by the ERDF that induces
higher acceptance probability for applications in the ERDF 1 region. The decreasing
strength of the instrument over time is also reflected in the precision of the IV estimates:
it is 1.922 and significant with a standard error of 0.874 in the period 2000-2002, and only
0.342 with a standard error of 1.160 in the period 2003-2005.
Robustness tests
We conducted several robustness tests in order to verify our empirical strategy and to
assess the validity of the ERDF instrument.
We begin by testing whether the endogenous entry of firms affects our results. Because
the ERDF program has been running since 1995 the firms knew about its existence at
the beginning of the program period 2000-2006. Thus, entering establishments may have
chosen their location partly on account of the fact that the probability of receiving the
support was higher in the regions with higher levels of aid. In order to find out whether
endogenous entry affects our results we estimated the effect of the program among the
firms that started up prior to 1994. Column 1 of Table 4 shows that among these “old
firms” the effect of the program is very similar compared to the full analysis sample. This
suggests that endogenous entry does not invalidate our results.
Our key identifying assumption is that conditional on our set of control variables, the
ERDF region and R&D expenditure are independent. Suppose that in the areas receiving
less aid the projects are of higher quality because of the higher concentration of R&D
and the more intensive R&D spillovers. In this case, the firms in this region would be
expected to have better R&D productivity and, as a result, to conduct more projects,
21For details of this calculation, see Footnote 16.
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which would show as higher R&D expenditure. If the differences in R&D spillovers are
important, firms in the regions receiving less aid may conduct more R&D compared to
those in the high-aid regions in the absence of subsidies. In our study this would result in
a negative bias in the IV estimate of the participation effect. However, if the estimated
effect were positive, as it is in our case, the analysis would not lose its evidential power:
the estimated effect will rather represent a lower bound to the actual effect. Column 2 in
Table 4 gives the results for a sample that excludes the less-aided ERDF 0 region, the aim
being to asses whether regional differences in the quality of R&D affect our results. The
estimate for the participation effect is somewhat larger, but in general it is of the same
magnitude as the full sample estimate. This indicates that differences in R&D spillovers
do not constitute a problem for our analysis.
Next we analyze whether regional features have an effect by including in the model a
set of regional control variables that could affect company R&D on the NUTS 4 level.22
In order to control for R&D spillovers we include the log of R&D concentration, which
we calculate as total R&D expenditure divided by acreage. To capture other effects of
the region we include the unemployment rate, the proportion of secondary production,
and the logged GDP per capita. The results are shown in Column 4. The effect of
being a subsidy grantee is now 1.452, which is slightly larger but similar in magnitude
compared to the estimate without regional controls. The finding that R&D concentration
and other key performance measures of the local economy do not affect our results gives
a strong indication that, conditional on our set of control variables, regional variation in
government R&D funding is exogenous.
As discussed in Section 3, the RDS, which is our source of data on R&D expenditure,
is not a random sample of R&D-inactive and new firms. We brought up the potential
concern that the proportion of supported firms in the region with higher aid levels is
overestimated in our sample because of the nonrandom sampling of applicant firms. It
is worth noting first, that our analysis includes only R&D-active firms, which are likely
always to be included in the sample, allthough we still cannot rule out the possibility that
the nonrandom sampling of new R&D-active firms could have affected our results. In
order to see whether this constitutes a problem for our analysis we compare the estimated
conditional probabilities of receiving support in the high-aid region between the full sample
22For the full NUTS 4 classification see http://www.stat.fi/meta/luokitukset/seutukunta/001-2007/.
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and the sample of “old firms”. An indication of an effect of the nonrandom sampling on
our results would be that the coefficient for the ERDF 1 dummy is smaller in the sample of
“old firms”. The reason for this is because the effect of the nonrandom sampling among the
old firms would be expected to have a smaller effect on the probability of receiving support
in the high-aid region because a smaller proportion of R&D-active old firms are sampled:
firms reporting R&D in the previous year are always included in the RDS sample frame.
The first-stage estimate for the ERDF dummy in the sample of “old firms” in Column 1
of Table 4 is 0.169, which is larger than the corresponding estimate in Table 2 (0.133).
This finding indicates that the nonrandom sampling of applying firms does not affect our
results.
Discussion
As explained in Section 4, we expected the effect of the program to be heterogeneous
among the participants, and we have identified a local average treatment effect, i.e. the
effect of program participation among the firms that enter it as a result of higher funding
in their region. If this is the case we will not be able to rule out the possibility that the
effect of the program would be different among the projects that would have received the
support even in the absence of the ERDF funding. In fact, we have good reason to believe
that the effect may be substantially smaller for a sizable proportion of projects that would
also be supported in the absence of ERDF funding. The agency’s report documenting
the results of a participant survey shows that more than 32 percent of the supported
projects would have been undertaken even without its support in the period 1999-2003
(Tekes, 2007). This figure may largely underestimate the actual proportion of projects
that would have been implemented even without government assistance because grantees
may feel that revealing that government support was not necessary for the completion of
the project may reduce the prospects of receiving assistance in the future.
According to the results of the agency’s survey, at least one third, and plausibly even
more, of supported projects were a priori privately profitable. Among these one would
expect a large share of government support to crowd out firms’ own R&D investments,
and as a result that the impact of the support would be small. On the other hand, the
large and positive effect revealed in our empirical analysis suggests that projects entering
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the program as a result of higher funding in their region are mainly privately unprofitable.
These observations have two implications. First, they suggest that projects entering the
program because of higher funding in ERDF 1 region are also those with lower research
productivity. Second, because these projects are unsupported in the absence of ERDF
funding and, as argued above, a large proportion of supported projects are privately
profitable, it seems likely that the agency will prioritize projects with higher potential
research productivity.
6 Conclusions
Government research and development (R&D) support programs are common across in-
dustrialized economies, and in several countries there has been political pressure to in-
crease government intervention in the R&D sector.23 This study provides new evidence
of the causal effect of government assistance on private R&D effort. Our identification
strategy was based on geographic differences in R&D support allocation in Finland, where
several regions are eligible for the highest level of European Union Regional Development
Fund (ERDF) aid because the population density is less than eight persons per square
kilometer. We controlled for the possible endogeneity of support allocation arising from
the population-density rule determining these regional provisions. We have shown that
the probability of receiving support is substantially higher in areas that are eligible for
the highest level of aid than in regions that are not. These differences provide exogenous
variation in program participation, which we used to identify the causal effect of program
participation on firm-level R&D expenditure.
According to our IV estimates, the program has quadrupled R&D expenditure among
firms entering it as a result of higher government R&D-support funding in their region.
We emphasize that our IV approach identifies the effect of the program only among firms
that change their participation status as a result of the higher funding in their region.
Thus, our results should not be interpreted as evidence of the aggregate effectiveness
of the program. Despite this deficiency, we believe that they are of significance in two
23For example, the European Commission has an overall goal of three percent for R&D as a proportion of
GDP, with two-thirds of this financed by the private sector (Commission of the European Communities,
2002), and the most recent data show that R&D in the EU was about 1.84 percent of GDP in 2006
(Eurostat, 2008).
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respects. First, we have shown that governments may induce additional company R&D
given correctly designed public R&D support policies. Second, the impact of R&D support
programs may be substantial: a conservative estimate is that one subsidy euro induces
1.5 euro of additional company R&D.
As explained in Section 4, it seems likely that a notable proportion of projects that
would have been supported irrespective of ERDF funding were privately profitable. Com-
bining this piece of evidence with our estimated large positive effect of the program, which
suggests that a substantial proportion of projects at the margin are privately unprofitable,
it seems likely that applicants with higher research productivity are ranked higher by the
agency. In this case, enlarging the program may seem advisable as projects that would
enter it as a result of increased funding would be those with lower rates of return on R&D,
and among which the impact of the program might be expected to be large. However,
if the large proportion of government funding crowds out private R&D in the group of
already subsidized projects, the most efficient way of improving social returns on public
R&D support spending may not be to expand the program; it may be better to restruc-
ture the incentives in such a way that the agency will prioritize R&D that would not be
pursued without its support.
Our study adds credence to the view that public policies promoting innovative ac-
tivities in the business sector may have a big impact on private R&D effort. As every
program has its own selection rules and managerial practices, results concerning the ef-
fectiveness of one are not directly generalizable to others. We believe that the findings
of this study are of significance for future empirical work because they suggest that the
effect of support may vary substantially among participating projects even within one
program. This stresses the importance of applying empirical strategies addressing the
potential selection on unobservable attributes, such as research productivity, and implies
that misinterpreting instrumental variable estimates as evidential about the average effect
of the program may result in misleading recommendations for future policy.
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Figure 1: Regional provision of ERDF in Finland during the program period 2000-2006.
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Table 1:
Descriptive statistics.
Analysis sample
R&D survey
panel
Treated Controls All All
R&D expendituret+1
Mean 850,024 372,488 445,733 701,812
25th percentile 90,000 46,685 51,750 0
Median 227,040 145,000 159,000 82,340
75th percentile 602,000 377,938 413,883 375,000
Standard deviation 2,217,689 733,739 1,112,301 2,881,385
R&D expendituret−1
Mean 691,451 335,694 390,261 644,675
25th percentile 58,635 45,203 46,512 16,000
Median 150,500 135,485 138,500 95,695
75th percentile 513,390 375,750 388,371 361,000
Standard deviation 1,609,434 629,286 864,665 2,535,446
Subsidyt+1
Mean 70,762 0 10,854 38,529
25th percentile 12,170 0 0 0
Median 30,889 0 0 0
75th percentile 76,287 0 0 18,326
Standard deviation 127,240 0 55,907 155,496
Subsidy intensityt+1
Mean 0.260 0 0.040 0.110
25th percentile 0.058 0 0 0
Median 0.138 0 0 0
75th percentile 0.283 0 0 0.106
Standard deviation 0.574 0 0.243 0.447
Age
Mean 13.25 14.75 14.52 13.14
25th percentile 6 7 7 6
Median 11 12 12 11
75th percentile 18 20 19 18
Standard deviation 10.44 11.02 10.94 10.54
Salest−1
Mean 34,640,000 33,680,000 33,820,000 36,337,009
25th percentile 1,039,000 1,518,000 1,444,000 677,933
Median 7,424,000 8,328,000 8,114,000 3,894,000
75th percentile 24,990,000 28,280,000 27,150,000 17,654,561
Standard deviation 110,971,823 102,997,107 104,225,538 168,583,602
Fixed assetst−1
Mean 26,470,000 14,895,954 16,670,000 37,200,000
25th percentile 199,200 169,587 181,000 120,000
Median 1,571,000 1,398,653 1,402,000 786,000
75th percentile 6,444,000 7,202,085 7,154,000 4,841,000
Standard deviation 150,037,223 44,369,169 71,590,466 413,655,751
Observations 254 1,402 1,656 8,354a
Notes: All monetary values are expressed in euros. The lower indexes t− 1 and t+ 1 refer
to the year before and the year after the treatment group started to receive the support.
Subsidy intensity is the ratio of subsidy to R&D expenditure.
a- The number of observations correspond to a sample that included information on
R&D expenditure for both years t− 1 and t+ 1. In that sample, information on subsidy,
subsidy intensity, age, sales, and fixed assets were available for 8,354, 6,032, 7,389, 8,166,
and 8,166 observations, respectively.
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Table 2:
OLS and IV estimates.
OLS 1st stage IV
R&D subsidy grantee 0.342 (0.057) *** 1.391 (0.695) **
ERDF Objective 1 0.133 (0.037) ***
log(R&Dt−1) -0.291 (0.161) * -0.239 (0.073) *** -0.051 (0.284)
log(R&Dt−1)2 0.040 (0.007) *** 0.011 (0.003) *** 0.029 (0.013) **
log(Salest−1) 0.196 (0.022) *** -0.026 (0.010) *** 0.223 (0.034) ***
log(Fixed assetst−1) -0.009 (0.017) 0.021 (0.008) *** -0.030 (0.026)
Age -0.006 (0.005) -0.004 (0.002) * -0.002 (0.007)
Age2 0.000 (0.000) ** 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Exporter 0.076 (0.064) 0.067 (0.029) ** 0.007 (0.087)
log(Population densityt−1) 0.014 (0.017) -0.001 (0.009) 0.029 (0.022)
Intercept 6.516 (1.228) *** 1.256 (0.557) ** 5.199 (1.596) ***
N 1656 1656 1656
Notes: Industry-year interaction dummy variables are included but not shown.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
90, 95 and 99 % confidence levels are denoted by “*”, “**”, and “***”, respectively.
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Table 3:
OLS and IV estimates, subperiods.
OLS 1st stage IV
A. 2000-2002
R&D subsidy grantee 0.305 (0.089) *** 1.922 (0.874) **
ERDF Objective 1 0.169 (0.054) ***
log(R&Dt−1) -0.002 (0.265) -0.332 (0.112) *** 0.508 (0.535)
log(R&Dt−1)2 0.027 (0.011) ** 0.016 (0.005) *** 0.002 (0.024)
log(Salest−1) 0.221 (0.035) *** -0.017 (0.015) 0.249 (0.052) ***
log(Fixed assetst−1) -0.022 (0.029) 0.014 (0.012) -0.046 (0.044)
Age -0.009 (0.007) 0.000 (0.003) -0.009 (0.010)
Age2 0.000 (0.000) ** 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Exporter -0.080 (0.110) 0.064 (0.046) -0.176 (0.152)
log(Population densityt−1) 0.006 (0.027) 0.002 (0.013) 0.033 (0.037)
Intercept 5.122 (1.779) *** 1.624 (0.752) ** 2.520 (2.939)
N 791 791 791
B. 2003-2005
R&D subsidy grantee 0.399 (0.073) *** 0.342 (1.160)
ERDF Objective 1 0.099 (0.052) *
log(R&Dt−1) -0.538 (0.195) *** -0.156 (0.096) -0.546 (0.257) **
log(R&Dt−1)2 0.053 (0.008) *** 0.007 (0.004) * 0.053 (0.011) ***
log(Salest−1) 0.173 (0.027) *** -0.032 (0.013) ** 0.172 (0.049) ***
log(Fixed assetst−1) 0.005 (0.020) 0.024 (0.010) ** 0.007 (0.035)
Age -0.001 (0.006) -0.008 (0.003) ** -0.002 (0.011)
Age2 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) * 0.000 (0.000)
Exporter 0.196 (0.076) *** 0.064 (0.037) * 0.199 (0.109) *
log(Population densityt−1) 0.018 (0.022) -0.002 (0.012) 0.017 (0.024)
Intercept 7.990 (1.321) *** 0.743 (0.652) 8.036 (1.499) ***
N 865 865 865
Notes: Industry-year interaction dummy variables are included but not shown.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
90, 95 and 99 % confidence levels are denoted by “*”, “**”, and “***”, respectively.
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Table 4:
IV estimates, robustness analysis.
(1) (2) (3)
R&D subsidy grantee 1.459 (0.739) ** 1.657 (1.000) * 1.452 (0.846) *
log(R&Dt−1) 0.039 (0.390) 0.298 (0.396) -0.029 (0.318)
log(R&Dt−1)2 0.025 (0.017) 0.012 (0.018) 0.028 (0.014) *
log(Salest−1) 0.196 (0.038) *** 0.138 (0.063) ** 0.230 (0.037) ***
log(Fixed assetst−1) -0.009 (0.033) 0.049 (0.050) -0.035 (0.031)
Age -0.006 (0.012) -0.005 (0.009) -0.002 (0.007)
Age2 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Exporter 0.113 (0.102) 0.210 (0.136) 0.000 (0.093)
log(Population densityt−1) 0.032 (0.027) 0.010 (0.058) -0.027 (0.066)
log(R&D concentrationt−1) 0.018 (0.031)
log(GDP per capitat−1) 0.096 (0.207)
Unemployment ratet−1 -0.622 (0.967)
Share of sec. prod.t−1 -0.029 (0.282)
Intercept 4.780 (2.079) ** 3.445 (2.241) 4.210 (2.484) *
1st stage regression
ERDF Objective 1 0.169 (0.046) *** 0.109 (0.046) ** 0.145 (0.050) ***
N 1029 752 1611
Notes: The estimates in Column (1) are based on a sample that only included firms that
started up prior to 1994. The estimates in Column (2) are based on a sample that excludes firms
in the ERDF 0 region, and those in Column (3) are based on a specification that includes regional
characteristics at the NUTS 4 level. Industry-year interaction dummy variables are included but
not shown. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
90, 95 and 99 % confidence levels are denoted by “*”, “**”, and “***”, respectively.
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